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direction� As often as not, then, policy 
and strategy are directed by war; they do 
not direct it� Responding to that reality 
requires a dialogue between soldiers and 
politicians—not the subordination of 
one element to the other, but rather their 
“harmonization” (p� 78)� For any kind 
of rationality to be imposed, politics 
must therefore listen to strategy, which 
must listen to war, both in its enduring 
nature and in its changing character� 
All this suggests a far more prominent 
role in the conversation for generals 
and admirals than current norms, often 
violated in practice, tend to permit�
As a student of the American founders 
and the American political tradition, 
this reviewer is not sure Strachan is right 
to challenge the Anglo-American taboos 
as much as he does� As a professor of 
strategy, however, I am certain Strachan  
has captured something vital for un-
derstanding the direction of any war� 
It arises from Clausewitz’s discussion 
of war as more than a true chameleon 
changing its colors from war to war� War 
does have a nature� It is embodied espe-
cially in Clausewitz’s trinity: the relation 
among reason, passion, and creativity 
that exists in any war� But that relation 
changes from war to war� Sometimes one 
element is more important than another, 
which gives an entirely different direc-
tion to a conflict than the one preceding 
or succeeding it� Sometimes the ele-
ments quarrel among themselves� Each 
attempts to give direction to war, and 
the changing historical direction of war 
is very much the result of the conversa-
tion among the parts and the interaction 
of their whole with others� No wonder, 
then, that Strachan does not give us the 
clear and final answers we crave� War 
will not allow them; neither will he� We 
therefore will have to figure the answers 
out for ourselves� A fine way to start is 
by reading this subtle and erudite book�
KARL WALLING
Authority, Ascendancy, and Supremacy: China, 
Russia, and the United States’ Pursuit of Relevancy 
and Power, by Gregory O� Hall� New York: Rout-
ledge, 2015� 188 pages� $145 (paperback $42�95)�
Gregory O� Hall, a professor of politi-
cal science at Morehouse College, has 
taken an acknowledged fact of con-
temporary international relations—the 
dominance of the United States, Russia, 
and China within the international 
system—and developed a compelling 
academic model supporting this�
Hall argues that the Tripolar Conflict, 
Cooperation, and Competition (TC3) 
Framework model reflects the real-
ity of the international system since 
at least the early 2000s� From Central 
Asia to the Middle East and Northeast 
Asia, Hall demonstrates that the United 
States, China, and Russia are locked in 
a complex web of interrelationships that 
increasingly determines the outcome 
of pressing regional, and even global, 
issues� As the traditional economic and 
military advantages of the United States 
decline relative to those of some rising 
powers, the international system will be 
even more defined by the interactions 
of these three dominant global powers�
Hall cogently traces the gradual transi-
tion of the global system following the 
“unipolar” moment that emerged after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1990s� While the United States 
remains first among equals in numerous 
metrics of national power, the compara-
tive diminution of its own influence 
and the rise of other power centers 
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have led to an international environ-
ment in which regional problems must 
be resolved in conjunction with the 
other critical global actors—namely, 
Russia and China. Hall contrasts previ-
ous examples of American unilateral 
action—from military intervention in 
the Balkans in the late 1990s to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq—with more recent 
examples of U.S. foreign policy be-
ing constrained by Russian or Chinese 
concerns. Whether it is Russian sup-
port for the al-Assad regime in Syria, 
China’s sustainment of the Kim dynasty 
in North Korea, or both Moscow and 
Beijing’s attempts to constrain pos-
sible U.S. military action against Iran’s 
nuclear program, Hall marshals the full 
panoply of regional issues to demon-
strate the relevance of his framework.
For the national security community, 
Hall’s work represents an important 
translation of international relations 
theory to the realm of practical policy 
making. His “strategic triangle” between 
the United States, Russia, and China is 
an accepted fact of international politics 
with which leaders around the world 
have grappled for at least the last decade. 
On almost any security issue of note, 
whether traditional or nontraditional, 
the acquiescence of at least two of the 
three major powers is essential for any 
action. Whether it is Russia and China 
constraining U.S. options in Middle 
East hot spots such as Syria or Iran, or 
the United States and China increasing 
their influence in traditionally Russian-
dominated Central Asia, the triangular 
relationship plays out on nearly every 
conceivable regional security question. 
While the popular literature continues 
to debate a “post-American world” 
and other slogans, a “strategic triangle” 
has long been the reality for Russian, 
Chinese, and U.S. decision makers.
While Hall is particularly adept at 
translating the academic literature into 
a compelling narrative that fits the 
global political reality, he is less sure 
footed in properly contextualizing the 
limits of American power. Although it is 
clear that global power is more diffuse 
than in the years directly following the 
Soviet Union’s collapse, and American 
power is certainly more constrained on 
a variety of regional issues, Washington 
still maintains an unparalleled ability to 
act militarily when and where it chooses 
even in the face of strong objections 
from Moscow and Beijing. The 2011 
intervention in Libya demonstrates that, 
while Russian and Chinese concerns 
were certainly considered in ways 
unheard of during the 1990s and early 
2000s, Washington still ultimately exer-
cises a tremendous degree of discretion 
in the use of force and remains able to 
apply its overwhelming military advan-
tage in a variety of contingencies despite 
deep misgivings in Moscow and Beijing. 
As Professor Hall rightly notes, the 
continued economic and military 
advances of less developed nations such 
as Turkey, Brazil, Iran, and South Africa 
will inject new forces and issues into the 
international agenda. Nontraditional 
security issues such as water scarcity 
and environmental degradation, while 
certainly not replacing the traditional 
primacy of inter-state competition 
and conflict, will likely act as a supple-
ment to those dynamics. As the global 
system seeks to adjust to these actors 
and issues, the predominance of the 
United States, China, and Russia in the 
international system and the reality of 
cooperation and competition between 
these powers will continue to define the 
twenty-first-century international order.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
6798_BookReviews.indd   132 3/9/16   1:58 PM
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 2, Art. 11
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss2/11
